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Despite endless economic, legal, and policy discussion about 
network neutrality over the last two decades,1 there has been little to 
no actual policy or regulation imposed. The Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) first ruled on the issue, fifteen years ago, in the 
cable-modem decision of 2002.2 Under Republican Chair Michael 
Powell, the FCC played a “hands-off” regulatory role, concluding 
that Internet access was an “information service” regulated under 
Title I,3 a rarely used and rather limp statutory authority. The FCC 
reasoned that the nascent Internet industry should be free from 
regulatory oversight in order to develop.4 Succeeding FCC chairs, 
under different Presidents, have tried to assume a larger regulatory 
role. But their efforts, notably in the 2008 BitTorrent Order5 and the 
2010 Open Internet Order,6 have failed. In both these instances, the 
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Other Facilities, 17 FCC Rcd. 4798, ¶ 38, at 4822 (2002) [hereinafter Cable Modem 
Order]; see also Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 
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13,028 (2008), vacated sub nom. Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642, 644 (D.C. 
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punishing Comcast for protocols aimed at discouraging peer-to-peer traffic). 
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456 Michigan State Law Review  2015:455 
D.C. Circuit rejected the FCC’s claims to have legal jurisdiction to 
regulate the Internet.7 
But this static policy cannot be blamed on legal, jurisdictional 
shortcomings alone. The sound and fury signifying nothing also 
stems from confusion about the basic terms of the discussion. As has 
been pointed out before, the Internet consists of a variety of networks 
that typically interconnect in bilateral-transit or peering agreements, 
making the weave of the web inherently “non-neutral”: certain bits 
inevitably receive different treatment and always have.8 Defining 
neutrality, openness, or whatever policy goal of “fair” treatment for 
web actors in a network that is inherently differential presents no 
clear policy rule. 
Or, at the very least, the FCC’s proposed standards for open or 
fair Internet—whether the Open Internet of 2010’s “reasonable 
network management” and “unreasonable discrimination”9 or the 
2014 Open Internet’s “minimum level of access” or “commercially 
reasonable”10—gloss over this fundamental difficulty of defining 
equal treatment. In fact, the proposed standards hide the inherent 
complexity of Internet interconnection—which constitutes the 
technical details that would determine differential (or equal) 
treatment of any bit of Internet traffic. The FCC could attempt to 
tackle the complexity of Internet interconnection, and at the very 
least, this would clarify the public discussion. Instead, its obfuscating 
regulatory concepts contribute towards legal and policy arguments 
that turn on calls on the Left to “[s]ave the Internet”11 and grave 
warnings of “[h]ands [o]ff the Internet” from the Right.12  
Is there anything new to say in the static debate? Well, the FCC 
seems poised to try again—indeed, as of the writing of this Article, 
the FCC has placed on its February calendar its order to implement 
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its most recent Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM).13 Taking to 
heart a comment by the D.C. Circuit that § 706 may provide the 
necessary jurisdiction,14 the FCC in its NPRM relies upon § 706 to 
regulate the Internet.15 Statute or not, President Obama’s 
endorsement of action on network openness almost determined 
action by someone.16 So it seems that now is the time that the debate 
will move in a new direction, if not move forward. 
The FCC’s previous network-neutrality efforts have depended 
upon ancillary jurisdiction under Title I—as an “information 
service”—as opposed to Title II, the comprehensive regulatory 
regime that the FCC has used to regulate interstate 
telecommunications for almost a century.17 This jurisdictional 
authority has traditionally been used to supplement existing 
jurisdictions, as with United States v. Southwestern Cable Co.18  
There, the Court relied upon § 152 to give the FCC jurisdiction to 
regulate cable television.19    
But, the FCC’s cable-modem order, the FCC’s effort to treat 
Title I use as an independent basis to regulate the dominant form of 
communications today, strains the text and structure of the 
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 14. See Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642, 659 (D.C. Cir. 2010) 
(“‘[S]ection 706(a) does not constitute an independent grant of forbearance authority 
or of authority to employ other regulating methods.’ Because the Commission has 
never questioned, let alone overruled, that understanding of section 706, and because 
agencies ‘may not . . . depart from a prior policy sub silentio,’ the Commission 
remains bound by its earlier conclusion that section 706 grants no regulatory 
authority.” (citations omitted) (quoting Deployment of Wireline Servs. Offering 
Advanced Telecomms. Capability, 13 FCC Rcd. 24,011, ¶ 69, at 24,044 (1998); 
FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1811 (2009))). 
 15. 2014 Open Internet NPRM, supra note 6, ¶ 4, at 5563. 
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 17. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 
967, 996-97 (2005); Cable Modem Order, supra note 2, ¶ 95, at 4847-48. 
 18.  392 U.S. 157, 172-73 (1968). 
 19. Id. (“Nothing in the language of s 152(a), in the surrounding language, 
or in the Act’s history or purposes limits the Commission's authority to those 
activities and forms of communication that are specifically described by the Act's 
other provisions. . . . We have found no reason to believe that s 152 does not, as its 
terms suggest, confer regulatory authority over ‘all interstate . . . communication by 
wire or radio.’”). 
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Communications Act. The most fundamental problem is that it is 
unclear as to what Title I Internet regulation is ancillary to. Title I’s 
ancillary expansion of Title II’s basic jurisdiction over 
telecommunications to include accounting policies for phone 
handsets made sense in Louisiana PSC because there was a regulated 
service: telephones, to which handsets were arguably ancillary. 
Broadband is a complete service by itself; it is not ancillary to 
anything. 
Regardless, in the important Brand X case, a bare majority 
upheld this authority by a six-to-three vote.20 Justice Breyer’s 
concurrence stated, in what could be characterized as a 
jurisprudential sigh, that the FCC’s jurisdictional claim under Title I, 
47 U.S.C. §§ 151, 152(b), was reasonable—”though . . . just 
barely.”21 
But, for the FCC, Title I proved to be a gift that quickly 
stopped giving; while the Supreme Court ruled that Title I gave the 
FCC power to regulate the Internet, the D.C. Circuit was unwilling to 
affirm any real regulatory regime built upon such a weak reed. In 
Comcast Corp. v. FCC22 and Verizon v. FCC,23 the D.C. Circuit 
struck down the FCC’s specific Open Internet regulations, reasoning 
that while Title I gave the FCC the jurisdiction to regulate the 
Internet, its grant of authority was too limited to support any 
meaningful regulation.24 
However, in Comcast, the court suggested that § 706 offered 
the possibility of giving the FCC jurisdiction to regulate the 
Internet—but, alas, the court observed that the FCC explicitly 
disclaimed any authority to regulate under § 706.25 The FCC in the 
2014 Open Internet NPRM claimed authority to regulate under 
§ 706.26 
So, there is much new concern about § 706. And rightly so, 
given that certainly the D.C. Circuit and perhaps even the Supreme 
Court will soon decide the matter, as the regulations the FCC is 
poised to promulgate will no doubt be appealed. And, indeed, 
                                                 
 20. 545 U.S. at 972. 
 21. See id. at 1003 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“I join the Court’s opinion 
because I believe that the Federal Communications Commission’s decision falls 
within the scope of its statutorily delegated authority—though perhaps just barely.”). 
 22. 600 F.3d 642 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 23. 740 F.3d 623 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
 24. Comcast Corp., 600 F.3d at 661; Verizon, 740 F.3d at 632.  
 25. Comcast Corp., 600 F.3d at 658-59. 
 26. 2014 Open Internet NPRM, supra note 6, ¶ 143, at 5610-11. 
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authors in our symposium have added much to that discussion, which 
will perhaps influence arguments presented to the Court.  
Professor Blevins points out, in a novel and insightful 
argument, that § 706 provides several unrecognized, pragmatic 
benefits.27 These include allowing the FCC to create rules at lower 
political and legal cost, thereby preserving the agency’s political 
capital.28 At the same time, the FCC would retain the threat of 
reclassification to § 201.29 This threat of stronger jurisdictional 
authority could deter anticompetitive behavior on the web.30  
Professor Hurwitz argues, quite creatively and convincingly, 
that § 706 offers a better basis for the FCC’s rules because Title II 
would lead to significant delay and market uncertainty.31 This would 
occur because Title II would require the FCC to forbear large 
portions of the statute, and as parties would challenge the FCC’s 
forbearance actions, there would be long delay and uncertainty 
created from the inevitable legal challenges to the forbearance 
actions.32 
Professor Frieden points out that § 706 jurisdiction gives the 
FCC the authority to promote broadband rollout and dissemination.33 
As such, measuring broadband access, always a difficult and 
tendentious task, will become a more central issue.34 As Professor 
Frieden points out, fundamental disagreement exists on what 
benchmarks to use: national penetration goals, localized goals to 
ensure that particular areas are not left out, what data speeds 
constitute broadband connections, etc.35 These highly technical issues 
will move to the forefront of FCC concerns.36 
These observations, indeed, are new, and I believe both helpful 
and important. To the degree I would add anything to them is to 
point out the “newness” of regulation under § 706. Consider previous 
grants of jurisdiction to the Federal Communications Commission. 
The first, § 201, which goes back to the 1934 and the original Act, 
                                                 
 27. John Blevins, The Risks and Rewards of Network Neutrality Under 
§ 706, 2015 MICH. ST. L. REV. 723, 729-31.  
 28. Id. at 729-30.  
 29. See id.  
 30. Id. at 730, 732-33. 
 31. Justin (Gus) Hurwitz, Net Neutrality: Something Old; Something New, 
2015 MICH. ST. L. REV. 665, 681-82.  
 32. Id. 
 33. Frieden, supra note 1, at 759.  
 34. Id. at 770-71.  
 35. Id.  
 36. Id. at 768-72. 
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gives the FCC jurisdiction to do very specific things, such as set rates 
and mandate routes of interconnection.37 
In 1934, regulators already had a long experience with setting 
rates.38 An elaborate and precise set of accounting rules, along with a 
relatively understood theory of pricing, guided these ratemakings.39 
And, indeed, the FCC has promulgated long-distance rates, and later 
long-distance access charges, without controversy for decades.40 
The 1996 Telecommunications Act constituted the next 
significant increase in FCC jurisdiction in §§ 251 and 252.41 They 
empowered the FCC to set interconnection rates between carriers and 
access charged for unbundled network elements for the local 
network.42 But, these sections required the FCC to do something that 
no one ever had before: set rates—in an ostensibly competitive 
market—for interconnecting telephone networks and for unbundling 
portions of telephone networks.43 The 1934 Act commands the FCC 
to set rates—rates which were in a monopolistic environment in 
which it could be possible, in theory, to capture the entire cost basis 
of the network.44  
In contrast to these well-understood ratemaking principles 
implicated in the 1934 Act, §§ 251 and 252 asked something—
access rates to portions of a network—which the FCC had never 
                                                 
 37. 47 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2012) (“It shall be the duty of every common 
carrier . . . in cases where the Commission, after opportunity for hearing, finds such 
action necessary or desirable in the public interest, to establish physical connections 
with other carriers, to establish through routes and charges applicable thereto and the 
divisions of such charges, and to establish and provide facilities and regulations for 
operating such through routes.”). 
 38. Adam Candeub, Network Interconnection and Takings, 54 SYRACUSE L. 
REV. 369, 382 (2004).  
 39.  Gregory J. Vogt, Cap-Sized: How the Promise of the Price Cap Voyage 
to Competition Was Lost in a Sea of Good Intentions, 51 FED. COMM. L.J. 349, 355 
(1999) (“In the 1960s, with the advent of some competition in the local market, the 
FCC turned to rate-of-return regulation, a widely used means of regulating industries 
with limited competition, in order to control the amount that could be charged by 
LECs for allowing a long-distance call to go over the long-distance network. More 
recently, as the idea that telephony is a natural monopoly has been discarded in the 
face of technological advances, regulators have considered alternative means of 
regulating rates charged by LECs to IXCs for interconnecting long-distance calls 
with the local networks.”). 
 40. See id. at 410-11. 
 41. 47 U.S.C. §§ 251-252. 
 42. Id. §§ 251(c)(2)-(3), 252(c), 252(d)(3). 
 43. Id. 
 44. See generally Irston R. Barnes, Bonbright, The Valuation of Property, 
52 Q.J. ECON. 155 (1937) (book review). 
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done before.45 Essentially, the 1996 Act gave the FCC carte blanche 
to create an entire regulatory regime. While the FCC achieved some 
success—for instance, the Supreme Court’s approval of its TELRIC 
pricing methodology46—the FCC certainly failed in the stated 
objective of the 1996 Act and the Local Competition Order47—to 
create a vibrant, competitive market in local telecommunication 
competition. And, indeed, many attribute its quixotic efforts as the 
cause of the telecommunications bubble, which burst so dramatically 
in 2000.48 
Yet compared to § 706, §§ 251 and 252 are crystalline in their 
precision. Section 706 makes the vaguest of commands and requires 
no established regulatory methodology, i.e., some sort of known 
ratemaking technique. Instead, it refers to all of them with a 
jurisdictional grant that seems aspirational, not instrumental:  
The Commission and each State commission with regulatory jurisdiction 
over telecommunications services shall encourage the deployment on a 
reasonable and timely basis of advanced telecommunications capability to 
all Americans (including, in particular, elementary and secondary schools 
and classrooms) by utilizing, in a manner consistent with the public 
interest, convenience, and necessity, price cap regulation, regulatory 
forbearance, measures that promote competition in the local 
telecommunications market, or other regulating methods that remove 
barriers to infrastructure investment.49  
This vagueness is a curse and an opportunity for the FCC. It 
has great freedom—a freedom that might result in spectacular 
failure, as did the implementation of local competition under the 
1996 Telecommunications Act. Or, it is a freedom that might result 
in rebuff from the D.C. Circuit. Only time will tell. 
Even if the D.C. Circuit were to uphold the FCC’s order, which 
given its current composition seems likely, we would still be left 
                                                 
 45. Without providing the entire regulatory scheme, §§ 251 and 252 set 
forth a system whereby carriers can purchase portions of “network elements” or 
interconnection on a per-minute or per-call basis. This is opposed to the traditional 
ratemaking of setting rates to recover the cost basis of the entire network.  
 46. See Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 527-28 (2002). 
 47. See Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the 
Telecomms. Act of 1996, 11 FCC Rcd. 15,499, ¶ 3, at 15,505 (1996) [hereinafter 
Local Competition Order] (stating that one of the principle goals of the 1996 Act 
was “opening the local exchange and exchange access markets to competitive 
entry”). 
 48. Peter W. Huber, Telecom Undone: A Cautionary Tale, MANHATTAN 
INST. FOR POL’Y RES. (Jan. 26, 2003), http://www.manhattan-
institute.org/html/miarticle.htm?id=4503#.VKozR3tc8Zw. 
 49. 47 U.S.C. § 1302(a) (2012). 
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with the regulatory question that no one has yet to answer: What is 
an open Internet? And, in particular, how does paid prioritization 
affect such an Internet? Despite the decades in which we have been 
involved with this issue, we still have trouble answering these 
questions because our legal and regulatory notions of openness and 
neutrality simply do not easily graft onto the reality of Internet 
routing.50 
Here, Sam Hurwitz adds in his interesting and important 
discussion of routing protocols.51 He argues that only in congested 
networks will paid prioritization degrade or hurt connections to other 
applications.52 In these situations,  
Given the (small, but hard to define) range of possible applications that 
could be adversely affected by prioritization, the uncertain ways and 
extent to which they may actually be affected in any particular case, and 
the myriad approaches to mitigating such effects, the Commission should 
address any concerns arising from prioritization on a case-by-case basis.53 
His caution reflects the difficulties the FCC will face if it 
attempts to determine what a “fair” or “open” Internet requires—
because capacity is largely a shared resource. What users and which 
packets receive which place and priority in the router cue are hard 
questions that the debate so far has tried to ignore.54 Certainly then, 
good answers will be new. 
                                                 
 50. Candeub & McCartney, supra note 8, at 531-32 (“[T]he failure to 
analyze the meaning of discrimination in a packet-switched network has led many in 
the debate to apply theoretical, even metaphorical, solutions that lack practical 
applications and leave engineers scratching their heads. For instance, Internet 
pioneer David Clark remarked that ‘[m]ost of what we have seen so far [concerning 
internet openness] . . . either greatly overreaches, or is so vague as to be nothing but 
a lawyer’s employment act.’” (alteration in original) (quoting David D. Clark, 
Network Neutrality: Words of Power and 800-Pound Gorillas, 1 INT’L J. COMM. 
701, 708 (2007))). 
 51. Hurwitz, supra note 31, at 714-19. 
 52. Id. at 717-18.  
 53. Id. at 718. 
 54. This problem with creating any legal standard from “best efforts” 
routing or other network engineering principles has been previously explored. See 
Candeub & McCartney, supra note 8, at 525 (“The term ‘best effort’ is misleading. 
Network engineers use it to describe a single default treatment of traffic. To some, 
this seems to define a neutral network. But is anything really the best if they are all 
the same? You are a special little snowflake . . . just like everyone else. Of course 
nobody wants your worst effort. Or what if something else is actually treated better? 
It is literally inaccurate to call it ‘best’ when some are treated better, and it is 
misleading if none are treated worse.” (footnotes omitted)). 
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Also, what is likely new to the debate is that unlike the first 
Open Internet Order, the FCC seems poised to enter deeper into the 
Internet. Its prior efforts were focused on the last mile—which is 
woefully inadequate. As the Comcast–Netflix dispute showed and as 
some commentators predicted, potentially discriminatory efforts can 
occur deeper in the Web.55 
While this widened focus will more effectively find potentially 
anticompetitive behavior, it still does not come to grips with the 
fundamental problem: “network neutrality,” “open Internet,” and 
“routing fairness” are legal concepts that do not translate in any 
recognizable way into routing practice, network engineering, or 
interconnection. Sam Hurwitz’s article focuses on the problem of 
applying these principles to routing, and others have demonstrated 
equal problems in interconnection. 
Instead of dealing squarely with this fundamental conceptual 
problem—a problem that will haunt and likely doom any Internet 
regulatory regime—the FCC in the 2014 NPRM once again abstracts 
away from it. The FCC’s standards for determining whether a 
network actor allows for a “minimum level of access,” refrains from 
“unreasonable discrimination,” or engages “commercially 
reasonable” contracts with other network actors are hopelessly 
vague.56 Again, these standards may prove intractable, so perhaps 
despite the FCC’s new regulatory energy and claimed jurisdictional 
authority, plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose. 
                                                 
 55. Id. at 500 (“An access provider can ‘outsource’ discrimination by 
adopting discriminatory terms in peering and transit contracts with other network 
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possibility.”); Christopher T. Marsden, Net Neutrality: The European Debate, J. 
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